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ABSTRACT 
Since February 2010, detailed information on every home mortgage default and foreclosure in New 
York State must be filed with the New York State Banking Department (NYSBD).
1
 Our analysis of the 
NYSBD data suggests that borrowers in default who took larger loans are more likely to progress to a 
foreclosure filing. It also suggests that reducing principal balances may reduce the foreclosure rate, but 
might have an adverse effect on the mortgage industry. 
Given the frequent criticism of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), it is no surprise 
that defaulted borrowers whose mortgages were modified via HAMP progress to a lis pendens filing a 
higher rate than defaulted borrowers without a modification or with a non-HAMP modification. After 
controlling for delinquency length (and other factors) however, we find that the HAMP program may have 
been effective in helping defaulted borrowers avoid foreclosure.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Under a New York State law enacted on December 15, 2009, mortgage servicers must send a 
“pre-foreclosure filing” (PFF) notice to delinquent borrowers at least 90 days prior to filing for 
foreclosure on a primary residence in the State of New York. The notice informs homeowners 
that their loan is in default, lists the amount necessary to cure the default and suggests measures 
that they can take to avoid foreclosure, such as negotiating a loan modification with their lender 
and consulting with a non-profit housing counselor (New York State Banking Department, 2009). 
Since February 13, 2010, mortgage servicers are also required to file the notices with the New 
York State Banking Department (which was recently merged into the Department of Financial 
Serices), which collected an extraordinary level of detail on the borrowers and the loans. Among 
the many data fields collected are: the property address, the names of the borrowers, the current 
monthly payment, the delinquent contractual payments, the interest rate, whether the loan is a 
fixed-rate or adjustable-rate mortgage, the date and the amount of the original loan, the lien type, 
the loan term, whether the loan has been modified or not and whether an investor’s approval is 
necessary to modify the loan. If the loan progresses to a lis pendens filing (i.e. the first step in the 
foreclosure process – the filing of the complaint), then servicers are also required to follow up on 
their initial filing with information on the entity filing for foreclosure. 
The detail captured in the PFF data makes three forms of analysis possible. First, we can 
match the defaulted loans to publicly available data on originations from the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA). By combining the HMDA and PFF data, we can see which borrowers 
were more likely to default. Second, we can compare the loans that entered the foreclosure 
process to those that did not. For reasons described below, we call this the “Short PFF” dataset. 
Finally, our “Full PFF” dataset allows us to compare defaulted loans across the years in which 
they were originated. 
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This paper discusses the findings of our analysis of the Full PFF and Short PFF datasets. We 
discuss our analysis of the combined HMDA-PFF dataset in a separate paper (Doviak and 
MacDonald, 2011).  
Not surprisingly, the financial characteristics of a loan are the best predictors of progression 
from default to a lis pendens filing. Larger loan amounts, larger monthly payments and adjustable 
interest rates all make a defaulted borrower more likely to enter the foreclosure process. Although 
the PFF data does not contain the loan-to-value ratio, we can surmise that borrowers who took 
out larger loans were left with less equity (or even negative equity) in their homes after home 
prices tumbled since the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 2008. Consequently, 
borrowers who took out larger loans may have had greater incentive to walk away from the loan 
and shift the loss onto the lender, or may have encountered difficulty in securing a modification 
that would avoid foreclosure. 
Another shortcoming of the PFF data is that it does not contain information on the borrower’s 
current or past income. However, for our purposes, we assume that larger monthly payments 
would make it more difficult for the borrower to remain current on the loan.  
All else equal, a higher interest rate also increases the borrower’s monthly payments, thus 
making the loan more difficult to repay. In this regard, it is important to note that mortgages 
without a fixed interest rate were more likely to progress from default to a lis pendens filing than 
those with a fixed interest rate. Once again, this is not surprising. When interest rates reset 
upward, the increasing cost of these adjustable-rate mortgages left many borrowers unable to 
afford the mortgage. 
What is surprising is that the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) may have 
been more successful in preventing foreclosure than its critics have suggested. Like many other 
studies, we find that HAMP-modified mortgages progress to a lis pendens filing at a higher rate 
than mortgages in default that were not modified or were modified outside of the HAMP 
program. However, this higher rate of progression may be attributable to the longer length of time 
HAMP-modified mortgages have been delinquent. After controlling for delinquency length (and 
other factors), we find that HAMP-modified mortgages were less likely to progress to a lis 
pendens filing, which indicates that the HAMP program may have been effective in helping 
defaulted borrowers avoid foreclosure. 
Prior to discussing those findings, we will examine the literature on mortgage modification 
and foreclosure prevention in section 2. Then, in section 3 we describe the PFF data in more 
detail and how we prepared it for analysis.  
Section 4 is the heart of this paper. It explores the question of “Who enters the foreclosure 
process? ” by comparing the defaulted loans that did not enter the foreclosure process to those 
that did. To control for the many different factors that can affect the probability that a loan will 
progress from default to foreclosure, section 5 provides a very basic regression analysis that 
attempts to resolve some of the questions that we find in the comparisons of the HMDA and PFF 
data and continues to explore the racial and ethnic dimensions of the foreclosure crisis.  
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of how lenders can use our findings to reduce the 
losses that they suffer when a loan enters the foreclosure process. 
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2.  REVIEW OF THE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION LITERATURE 
The subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis, which began in 2006 and escalated rapidly through 
2007 and 2008, was one of the first indicators that the nation’s housing bubble would burst. It 
also foreshadowed the onset of the financial and credit crises that unfolded during 2008 and 
2009, resulting in a persistently high rate of unemployment that contributed to the national wave 
of foreclosures that began in 2008.  
The sharp rise in and sustained high levels of unemployment since 2008 is tied to the 
continued high rates of default and foreclosure. However, unemployment alone does not explain 
the recent surge in defaults and foreclosures. The current analysis examines the character of the 
loans originated since 1976 which had a significant role in the surge in defaults and foreclosure 
beginning in 2006. It is this initial crisis that regulators responded to by adopting several major 
loan modification programs. This section provides an overview of loan modification programs 
adopted since 2008 and discusses their relative success in stemming the foreclosure crisis. 
The primary programs – the Making Home Affordable program3, the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP)
4
 and the FHA’s HOPE for Homeowners Program5 – have relied 
upon the voluntary participation of lenders and servicers. These programs have employed a 
number of incentives to encourage participants to modify the loans of homeowners at risk of 
default and foreclosure. Overall, they have reached a relatively small percentage of the borrowers 
in need because the participation of lenders and loan servicers is voluntary and because many 
lenders and loan servicers have resisted efforts to persuade them to reduce principal balances. 
According to CoreLogic (2011), at the end of the fourth quarter of 2010, approximately 11 
million U.S. households – representing an estimated 23 percent of all homes with a mortgage – 
owed more on their homes than their home was worth. As of May 2011, more than two million 
borrowers were seriously delinquent on their loans (90 days or more past due), while another two 
million homeowners were in some stage of the foreclosure process (RealtyTrac, 2011). 
In an effort to address the significant rise in delinquency and foreclosure, HAMP was 
established under the U.S. Treasury Department as part of the Making Home Affordable program 
in October 2009. HAMP has aimed to encourage lenders to modify the principal balance and 
interest rate on the home mortgages of borrowers who have good repayment histories but are 
experiencing financial hardship and are viewed as at risk (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2009). 
Analysis of the Treasury Department’s own published reports on HAMP’s performance 
indicates that, as of June 2011, a total of 772,559 homeowners were participating in active trial 
modifications or active permanent modifications (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2011). However 
almost half (46.4 percent) of the 1.6 million trial modifications started under the Making Home 
Affordable program were cancelled as of June 2011. The cancellations were the result of 
borrowers missing three payments after having been placed in a trial modification (U.S. Dept. of 
the Treasury, 2011). 
Nevertheless, these programs may have had some success in reducing the foreclosure rate. 
According to RealtyTrac (2011), in May 2011, foreclosure filings nationally declined to their 
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lowest level since December 2006, reaching a 53-month low. The decline also reflected a 33 
percent decrease nationally from May 2010 and a 41 percent decline in New York State over the 
same one-year period. It should also be noted, however, that some of this decline may be 
attributable to the moratorium on foreclosure actions agreed to by the major lenders and servicers 
in September 2010 in response to the “robo signing” scandal.  
While HAMP had some modest successes, other programs have been far less successful. 
Using its authority to provide mortgage insurance for refinancing the mortgages of borrowers at 
risk of default and foreclosure, the FHA introduced its HOPE for Homeowners Program in 
October 2008. Four months after the program began however, the FHA had only received 451 
applications and closed a mere 25 loans, far short of the 400,000 homeowners that the program 
had been expected to help (Naylor, 2009).  
While changes were made to attract participation, its prospects are not very bright. One key 
problem is that participation is voluntary.Lenders do not have to agree to a modification that 
writes down any portion of the loan's value. A second problem is that the borrowers most in need 
are the ones least likely to be served by the program. For example, borrowers with a lower credit 
score or more erratic payment history must meet more stringent qualifying criteria. Moreover, the 
program’s allowance for higher payment-to-income ratios (up to 38 percent) and debt-to-income 
ratios (as high as 50 percent) (US OCC, 2010) deters both borrowers and lenders from 
participating. 
While changes to the FHA program were adopted to attract participation, its prospects are still 
not very bright. One key problem is that participation is voluntary. Lenders do not have to agree 
to a modification that writes down any portion of the loan’s value. A second problem is that the 
borrowers most in need are the ones least like to be served by the program. For example, 
borrowers with a lower credit score or more erratic payment history must meet more stringent 
qualifying criteria. Such requirements exclude many borrowrs and deter many lenders from 
participating.  
A further problem involves the requirement that lenders participating in the program be FHA 
approved lenders. This posed a barrier to many borrowers who took out loans between 2004 and 
2008 and relied increasingly on lenders who specialized almost exclusively in sub-prime 
originations. Many of these lenders were not FHA approved, automatically excluding them from 
participation in the FHA-HOPE program. Just 87 FHA approved lenders out of a total of 1,383 
HMDA lenders originated loans in New York State between 2004 and 2008. FHA approved 
originations accounted for 28.4 percent of total originations over this period. 
    More importantly, the continued decline in home values places lenders at risk of holding a loan 
that is greater than the home’s value and thus eliminating the possibility of securitizing the loan. 
Home prices declined an average of 8.3 percent from first quarter 2009 through first quarter 2011 
(FHFA, 2011). The resulting low appraisal values have hindered millions of homeowners – not 
just those at risk – from refinancing their loans. 
From the perspective of a borrower in a negative equity position, shifting losses onto the 
lender through the foreclosure process may be a regretable but financially sensible course of 
action. Consequently, reductions in principal balance may be necessary to avert foreclosure. 
According to the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (SFPWG)
6
, which analyzed a 
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longitudinal dataset of nine loan servicers, modifications that included significant reductions in 
principal balance tended to have lower re-default rates than their counterparts. This finding led 
the group to recommend reducing principal balances on loans in areas impacted by significant 
home price declines (SFPWG, Aug. 2010). Similarly, Querci and Ding (2009) found that 
borrowers were less likely to redefault on their home mortgage when their monthly payments 
were reduced through a balance-reducing loan modification. 
Such modifications are rare however. Modifications with a significant reduction in principal 
balance represent just 20 percent of the loan modifications that the SFPWG studied. In most 
modifications, the loan amount increased as service charges and late payments were rolled into 
the loan.  
With the onset of the financial crisis in late 2008, the SFPWG concluded that a 
comprehensive approach to loan modification was necessary. At the time the fourth report was 
issued in January 2010, it was estimated that just four out of ten seriously delinquent borrowers 
were on track for any kind of loan modification. The authors also conclude that while the HAMP 
program increased the percentage of borrowers participating in some form of loan modification, 
the rapidly rising number of such delinquent borrowers has meant that HAMP has merely been 
able to slow the foreclosure crisis, and that its efforts have not been able to keep pace with the 
rising scale of delinquencies (SFPWG, Jan. 2010).  
 
3.  NEW YORK STATE PRE-FORECLOSURE FILING DATA 
As mentioned in the introduction, in February 2010, the New York State Banking Department 
(NYSBD) began collecting data on home mortgages in default. When the borrower defaults on 
his/her primary residence, his/her mortgage servicer sends him/her a “pre-foreclosure filing” 
(PFF) notice and transmits an extraordinary level of detail on the mortgage to the NYSBD. If the 
borrower does not cure the default within 90 days, the servicer may commence the foreclosure 
process with a lis pendens filing. If the lender moves ahead with foreclosure procedings, it must 
also inform the NYSBD of the lis pendens filing. 
Because the PFF dataset contains information on both defaults and foreclosures, the analysis 
in this paper compares defaulted loans that did not progress to foreclosure to those that did. 
Given the 90-day window between the date that the PFF notice was sent and the commencement 
of foreclosure proceedings, such an analysis requires examination of a subset of the data. We 
refer to this subset as the “Short PFF” dataset to distinguish it from the “Full PFF” dataset, which 
contains all of the PFF filings. 
This paper also makes reference to the Full PFF dataset because it is useful for comparing 
defaulted loans by year of origination. For example, table 7 shows that defaulted loans originated 
between 2004 and 2007 were more likely to be adjustable rate mortgages than loans originated in 
other years. 
Prior to making these comparisons however, we first explain how we prepared the PFF 
dataset for statistical analysis in this section. After providing that explanation, we discuss our 
comparisons in section 4 and provide a basic regression analysis in section 5. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Year of Origination  
Year of Origination Total Percent 
1976-1989 2,502 1.3% 
1990-1999 13,692 7.3% 
2000 2,414 1.3% 
2001 4,390 2.4% 
2002 7,470 4.0% 
2003 16,706 9.0% 
2004 18,669 10.0% 
2005 28,506 15.3% 
2006 35,947 19.3% 
2007 31,771 17.0% 
2008 16,019 8.6% 
2009 6,957 3.7% 
2010 1,323 0.7% 
Total 186,366 100.0% 
Data: Short PFF  
 
Prior to performing an analysis of the PFF data, we had to remove duplicate filings because 
servicers who missed the three-business day deadline or submitted incorrect information would 
“re-file” the loan. Some servicers also submitted one filing for each borrower on the loan.  
The duplicates were fairly easy to identify however, because servicers almost always included 
their loan numbers with the filing, so the combination of the servicer’s identity and the loan 
number enabled us to uniquely identify each loan
7
. In cases where a servicer submitted one filing 
for each borrower, we compared the borrower’s first and last name to the names of other 
borrowers on the loan to see if there was a co-applicant or not. 
In cases where servicers re-filed loans to correct mistakes, we assumed that the most recent 
filing submitted contained the correct information. However if one of the duplicates contained 
information on a lis pendens filing, we retained that information. 
Using this method, we found a total of 214,705 unique loans and 33,859 duplicates in the PFF 
dataset. From there, we removed records that contained obvious errors (e.g. loans that were 
originated in the future) and records of 90-day letters that were not mailed in the year 2010. This 
reduced the PFF dataset to 211,962 clean records. 
To ensure comparability across loans, we chose to focus on first-lien mortgages. This reduced 
the PFF dataset to 186,366 records, but it was a necessary step because a first-lien mortgage is 
very different from a home equity line of credit (HELOC). The former is frequently taken for the 
purpose of purchasing a home, while the latter is often used for home improvement. It should be 
noted that during the housing boom, it became increasingly common practice for lenders to 
originate second liens for borrowers who did not have the required 20 percent down payment 
instead of mortgage insurance. In an environment where house prices escalated rapidly, the 
second lien was potentially more profitable to the lender than personal mortgage insurance, 
which could be ended by the borrower once he/she had 20 percent home equity – a condition that 
could be attained rather quickly at the time.  
Finally, we wanted to know which of the loans that were in default progressed to foreclosure. 
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To preserve the comparison, we continued to focus on first-lien mortgages originated between 
2004 and 2008, but – given the required 90-day period between filing a pre-foreclosure notice 
and the commencement of foreclosure proceedings (with a lis pendens filing) – we also had to 
restrict our attention to the loans that were filed prior to July 1, 2010 when preparing the Short 
PFF dataset. 
 
Table 2: Rate of Lis Pendens Filings by Month when PFF Letter Sent 
2010 Lis Pendens PFF Letters Rate 
January 9 1,573 0.6% 
February 1,745 8,171 21.4% 
March 1,416 12,625 11.2% 
April 1,725 12,847 13.4% 
May 1,807 14,135 12.8% 
June 1,474 27,810 5.3% 
July 657 20,139 3.3% 
August 405 16,779 2.4% 
September 68 13,837 0.5% 
October 24 15,395 0.2% 
November 119 13,438 0.9% 
December 17 27,623 0.1% 
Total 9,466 184,372 5.1% 
Data: Full PFF 
 
Ideally, we would have chosen a later cut-off date, but the fact that Bank of America, JP  
Morgan Chase, GMAC Mortgage and other large lenders suspended foreclosure actions in late-
September 2010 in the wake of the robo signing controversy, left us with little choice. As table 2 
shows, there was a sharp drop in the number of loans that progressed to a lis pendens filing 
among loans that received a pre-foreclosure filing from July 2010 onward. 
Another difficulty arose because the law which required mortgage servicers to file the pre-
foreclosure filing notices did not explicitly require servicers to notify the NYSBD when the 
mortgage progressed to a lis pendens filing. The NYSBD strongly pressed servicers to update the 
filings however and most servicers complied. While most servicers complied with NYSBD’s 
requests to provide such notification, the suspension of foreclosure actions by three of the largest 
servicers and the small degree of non-compliance with the NYSBD’s two-step filing process 
convinced us that we should limit the Short PFF dataset to loans submitted by servicers with at 
least 40 total filings and who notified the NYSBD of a lis pendens filing on at least five percent 
of their loans. This step ensured that the information in the dataset would accurately reflect 
whether the loan progressed to a lis pendens filing or not. 
 
4.  WHO ENTERS THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS?  
As mentioned in the introduction, the financial characteristics of a loan – such as the loan 
amount, monthly payment and whether the interest rate is fixed or adjustable – are the best 
predictors of progression from default to foreclosure. For example, table 3 shows that – among 
borrowers who defaulted – 56  percent of those who entered the foreclosure process with a lis 
pendens filing borrowed more than $250,000, whereas only 44  percent of borrowers who did not 
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go into foreclosure borrowed more than $250,000. 
 
Table 3: Lis Pendens Filing by Loan Amount (in thousands) 
Loan Amount No lis pendens Lis pendens Percent 
under 50 6.3% 3.4% 5.9% 
50 to 99 19.7% 14.1% 18.8% 
100 to 249 29.9% 26.2% 29.3% 
250 to 399 26.3% 33.1% 27.4% 
400 to 499 9.4% 12.4% 9.9% 
500 and up 8.2% 10.8% 8.6% 
Total 36,865 7,152 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Unfortunately, the PFF dataset does not have information on the loan-to-value ratio, so we do 
not know if and how far the recent collapse in home prices pushed these borrowers “underwater.” 
Nonetheless, borrowers who took out larger loans would have had greater incentive to shift their 
losses onto their lenders by walking away from the loan if the drop in home prices left them with 
less equity (or negative equity). 
Another possible reason why defaulted borrowers with large loan amounts are more likely to 
enter the foreclosure process is because – all else equal – they would have to make larger 
monthly payments. In fact, the distributions are very similar. As table 4 indicates, among 
borrowers who defaulted, 58  percent of those who entered the foreclosure process had a monthly 
payment of $2,000 or more, whereas only 46  percent of the defaulted borrowers who did not 
progress to a lis pendens filing had a monthly payment in excess of $2,000. 
Surprisingly however, there is no clear relationship between a defaulted borrower’s current 
interest rate and his/her chances of progressing to a lis pendens filing (as shown in table 5). The 
lack of a clear relationship may be attributable to the fact that we’re looking at borrowers who 
have already defaulted. A high interest rate may be a good predictor of default, but not a good 
predictor of progression to a foreclosure filing. 
 
Table 4: Lis Pendens Filings by Monthly Payment 
 Monthly payment No lis pendens Lis pendens Percent 
under 1,000 26.2% 17.1% 24.7% 
1,000 to 1,499 14.6% 12.3% 14.2% 
1,500 to 1,999 13.3% 13.1% 13.3% 
2,000 to 2,499 13.3% 15.5% 13.7% 
2,500 to 2,999 12.5% 15.3% 13.0% 
3,000 to 3,999 13.0% 17.6% 13.7% 
4,000 and up 7.0% 9.2% 7.4% 
Total 36,865 7,152 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
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Table 5: Lis Pendens Filings by Interest Rate 
 Interest rate No lis pendens Lis pendens Percent 
under 4.000 4.5% 3.5% 4.4% 
4.000 to 4.999 4.3% 4.1% 4.3% 
5.000 to 5.999 21.9% 20.6% 21.7% 
6.000 to 6.999 34.4% 39.6% 35.3% 
7.000 to 7.999 17.5% 17.1% 17.4% 
8.000 to 9.999 12.1% 11.1% 11.9% 
10.000 and up 5.3% 4.1% 5.1% 
Total 36,865 7,152 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
The characteristic of interest rates that does predict progression from default to foreclosure is 
whether the interest rate is fixed or adjustable. Defaulted mortgages with adjustable interest rates 
progress to a lis pendens filing at slightly higher rate, while mortgages with payment option 
adjustable interest rates and interest only mortgages progress at a much higher rate (table 6).  
 
Table 6: Lis Pendens Filings by Loan Type  
  Loan Type No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
Fixed Rate 84.4% 15.6% 35,117 
Adjustable Rate 82.6% 17.4% 7,309 
Pay Option Adjustable Rate 78.5% 21.5% 451 
Interest Only 73.5% 26.5% 1,140 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Borrowers’ difficulty in repaying loans with an adjustable rate mortgage also helps to explain 
why loans originated between 2004 and 2007 constitute 62 percent of all pre-foreclosure filings 
(as shown in table 1). Of the loans that went into default, those that were originated between 
2004 and 2007 were more likely to be adjustable rate mortgages those originated in other years, 
as shopwn in table 7. 
Interestingly, adding a co-borrower to the loan did not necessarily reduce the odds that a loan 
would progress from default to foreclosure. As table 8 shows, the percentage of defaulted loans 
that progressed to a lis pendens filing was approximately the same for loans with a co-borrower 
and loans without a co-borrower. The regression model in section 5 however, suggests that after 
controlling for other factors, loans with a co-borrower are less likely to progress to foreclosure. 
Not surprisingly, defaulted borrowers who have a larger delinquent payment amount (i.e. the 
missed monthly payments plus late fees, etc.) are more likely to progress from default to a lis 
pendens filing. As the data insummarized in table 9 indicates, 70  percent of borrowers in default 
who entered the foreclosure process were delinquent by $5,000 or more, while fewer than half - 
49  percent - of defaulted borrowers who did not progress to a lis pendens filing owed $5,000 or 
more. 
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Table 7: Loan Type by Year of Origination 
    Year of Origination Fixed Rate Adjustable Rate  Pay Option ARM Interest Only Total 
1976-1989 51.1% 48.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2,502 
1990-1999 89.1% 10.8% 0.1% 0.0% 13,692 
2000 90.6% 9.2% 0.0% 0.1% 2,414 
2001 93.9% 6.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4,390 
2002 93.2% 6.6% 0.0% 0.1% 7,470 
2003 92.4% 7.3% 0.1% 0.2% 16,706 
2004 83.5% 15.3% 0.4% 0.8% 18,669 
2005 73.8% 22.5% 1.2% 2.5% 28,506 
2006 69.0% 26.2% 1.9% 2.9% 35,947 
2007 77.7% 17.3% 1.8% 3.2% 31,771 
2008 93.9% 4.6% 0.6% 0.9% 16,019 
2009 97.6% 2.3% 0.0% 0.2% 6,957 
2010 92.4% 7.3% 0.0% 0.3% 1,323 
Percent 81.2% 16.1% 1.0% 1.7% 186,366 
Data: Full PFF 
 
 
Table 8: Lis Pendens Filings by Additional Borrower 
  Co-borrower Status No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
No co-borrower 83.3% 16.7% 26,501 
Co-borrower 84.4% 15.6% 17,516 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Table 9: Lis Pendens Filings by Amount of Delinquent Payment 
 Amount of Delinquency No lis pendens Lis pendens Percent 
under 1,000 4.1% 0.9% 3.5% 
1,000 to 2,499 21.3% 9.6% 19.4% 
2,500 to 4,999 26.0% 19.2% 24.9% 
5,000 to 7,499 17.7% 18.0% 17.8% 
7,500 to 9,999 8.5% 10.8% 8.9% 
10,000 to 19,999 11.6% 20.4% 13.0% 
20,000 to 49,999 7.1% 15.0% 8.4% 
50,000 and up 3.6% 6.0% 4.0% 
Total 36,865 7,152 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
 
Table 10: Lis Pendens Filings by Modification     
 
No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
No modification 83.9% 16.1% 34,962 
HAMP modification 81.3% 18.7% 4,335 
Non-HAMP modification 85.2% 14.8% 4,720 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Finally, the information summarized in table 10 indicates that defaulted borrowers whose 
mortgages were modified via the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) had 
progressed to a lis pendens filing at a higher rate than defaulted borrowers whose mortgages were 
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either not modified at all or modified outside of the HAMP program. 
However, this is not in itself sufficient evidence that the HAMP program was unsuccessful. 
Table  12 shows that mortgage servicers tended to send a pre-foreclosure filing notice (i.e. our 
indicator of default) at a much later stage of delinquency to borrowers who eventually entered the 
HAMP program. The findings summarized in table 11 suggest that borrowers who received a pre-
foreclosure filing notice at a later stage of delinquency are far more likely to progress to a lis 
pendens filing. 
 
Table 11: Lis Pendens Filings by Length of Delinquency 
   No lis pendens Lis pendens Percent 
Less than 60 days 58.0% 31.8% 53.7% 
61-90 days 15.1% 16.3% 15.3% 
91-120 days 6.5% 9.9% 7.0% 
More than 120 days 20.5% 42.0% 24.0% 
Total 36,865 7,152 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Table 12: Modifications by Length of Delinquency  
  Length of Delinquency No modification HAMP modification Non-HAMP mod. Percent 
Less than 60 days 54.9% 28.9% 68.0% 53.7% 
61-90 days 16.1% 13.4% 11.0% 15.3% 
91-120 days 6.6% 11.7% 5.8% 7.0% 
More than 120 days 22.4% 46.0% 15.2% 24.0% 
Total 34,962 4,335 4,720 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
Consequently, the high rates of progression to a lis pendens filing among defaulted borrowers 
who participated in the HAMP program may be attributable to the late stage at which the 
NYSBD was notified of the default. In the next section, we’ll revisit this question and show that 
defaulted borrowers who participated in the HAMP loan modification program were much less 
likely to progress to a lis pendens filing than defaulted borrowers whose mortgages were either 
not modified at all or modified outside of the HAMP program. 
 
5.  SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
With few exceptions, our findings that the financial characteristics of a home mortgages are good 
predictors of whether a loan progresses from default to foreclosure are not surprising. The rate of 
progression from default to a lis pendens filing is higher among defaulted borrowers who took 
out larger loans, who must make larger monthly payments and who face adjustable interest rates. 
However, there were two questions raised by our findings. One was why the rate of 
progression to a lis pendens filing bore no relation to the rate of interest on the loan. Another 
question was why the presence of a co-borrower made little difference in the progression toward 
foreclosure. 
Further, as stated previously, we found that a larger proportion of defaulted borrowers whose 
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mortgages were modified via the HAMP program progressed to a lis pendens filing, but 
speculated that this difference may be attributable to the fact that their loans were reported the the 
NYSBD at a later stage of delinquency. As such, the findings summarized in table 10 are not 
necessarily an indictment of the HAMP program. 
In an attempt to address some of these questions, this section presents a basic regression 
analysis employing probit models to estimate the probability that a defaulted loan will progress 
from default to a lis pendens filing. This allows us to examine the effect of one variable while 
holding others constant. The analysis presented here does not place the variables in a theoretical 
framework, nor does it conduct tests for robustness across specifications. Such work is left to 
future research. 
Prior to discussing the probit models of the probability that a borrower will progress from 
default to a lis pendens filing, it is worth noting that the overall rate at which loans in the Short 
PFF dataset progressed from default to a lis pendens filing is only about 16 percent. The low 
overall rate is attributable to two factors. First, approximately half of all borrowers were 
delinquent for less than 60 days when the servicer filed the pre-foreclosure filing notice (as noted 
in table 11). These loans were less likely to progress to a lis pendens filing than those that had 
been deliquent for a longer period of time. Second, nearly 48 percent of borrowers who defaulted 
owed less than $5,000 (table 9). Not surprisingly, their loans were less likely to progress to a lis 
pendens filing than borrowers who owed more. 
In choosing variables to include in the probit models, we took note of the high degree of 
correlation among the original loan amount, the monthly payment and the amount of delinquent 
payment. Consequently, we excluded the original loan amount and the monthly payment from 
two of the regression models and used the measure of extent of delinquency as a predictor of 
progression from default to foreclosure. This helps illustrate that the original loan amount, the 
monthly payment and the amount of delinquent payment are all good predictors of progression 
from default to foreclosure. 
Interestingly, the regression results suggest that – after controlling for other factors – 
defaulted borrowers with an adjustable rate mortgage or a payment option adjustable rate 
mortgage do not progress to foreclosure at a significantly higher rate than defaulted borrowers 
with a fixed rate mortgage. However, the difference between defaulted borrowers with a fixed 
rate mortgage and defaulted borrowers with an interest only loan is statistically significant. Those 
with an interest only loan are more likely to progress to foreclosure. One possible explanation for 
this finding is that borrowers must begin paying principal after five to ten years. 
These regression results also provide some answers to the questions raised earlier. A defaulted 
borrower’s probability of progressing to foreclosure is positively correlated with the interest rate 
that he/she pays on the loan and the coefficient is statistically significant. 
The probit models also help resolve the question regarding the finding that loans with a co-
borrower progress to foreclosure at approximately the same rate as those without co-borrower 
(table 8). After controlling for other factors, defaulted loans with a co-borrower are negatively 
correlated with the probability of progression to a lis pendens filing. 
Finally, the regression results indicate that the HAMP program may have been more 
successful than critics have argued. In the Short PFF dataset, defaulted borrowers with a HAMP-
modified mortgage progressed to foreclosure at a higher rate, but the regression results suggest 
that this difference is attributable to the fact that they received a pre-foreclosure filing notice at a 
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later stage of delinquency (as we saw in tables 10, 11, and 12). After controlling for other factors, 
defaulted borrowers with a HAMP-modified mortgage were significantly less likely to progress 
to foreclosure than their counterparts without a modification or with a non-HAMP modification. 
 
Table 13: Probit Models, Dependent Variable: Lis Pendens Filing       
  
 
Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 Model #4 
 ln(Orig. Loan Amount) 0.0795 *** 
  
0.0592 * 0.0658 * 
 
 
(0.0171) 
   
(0.0275) 
 
(0.0273) 
 
 ln(Amt. Delinquent Payment) 0.0456 *** 0.0424 ** 0.0411 ** 0.0386 ** 
 
 
(0.0123) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
 ln(Monthly Payment) 
  
0.0779 *** 0.0283 
 
0.0267 
 
    (0.0182)  (0.0294)  (0.0292)  
 Delinq. 61-90 days 0.3429 *** 0.3444 *** 0.3443 *** 0.3483 *** 
  (0.0219)  (0.0220)  (0.0220)  (0.0220)  
 Delinq. 91-120 days 0.5230 *** 0.5258 *** 0.5260 *** 0.5315 *** 
  (0.0290)  (0.0291)  (0.0291)  (0.0291)  
 Delinq. over 120 days 0.6607 *** 0.6664 *** 0.6674 *** 0.6716 *** 
  (0.0253)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  (0.0262)  
 Current Int. Rate -0.0049 
 
-0.0090 . -0.0060 
 
-0.0050 
 
  (0.0049)  (0.0048)  (0.0050)  (0.0050)  
 Adj. Rate 0.0190 
 
0.0242 
 
0.0199 
   
  (0.0212)  (0.0211)  (0.0212)    
 Pay. Op. Adj. Rate 0.0178 
 
0.0524 
 
0.0275 
   
  (0.0708)  (0.0705)  (0.0715)    
 Interest Only 0.1984 *** 0.2121 *** 0.2005 *** 
  
  (0.0431)  (0.0428)  (0.0432)    
 Not Fixed Rate Mortgage 
      
0.0468 * 
        (0.0196)  
 Modified via HAMP -0.1350 *** -0.1358 *** -0.1358 *** -0.1404 *** 
  (0.0254)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0254)  
 Modified, non-HAMP 0.0058 
 
0.0090 
 
0.0063 
 
0.0050 
 
  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  
 Additional Borrower on Loan -0.0678 *** -0.0678 *** -0.0682 *** -0.0711 *** 
  (0.0157)  (0.0157)  (0.0157)  (0.0157)  
 Payment Includes Escrow 0.1697 *** 0.1558 *** 0.1650 *** 0.1700 *** 
  (0.0200)  (0.0202)  (0.0206)  (0.0204)  
 Loan Investor Owned -0.1576 *** -0.1567 *** -0.1567 *** -0.1507 *** 
  (0.0186)  (0.0186)  (0.0186)  (0.0185)  
 ln(Number Filings by Servicer) 0.0474 *** 0.0470 *** 0.0468 *** 0.0464 *** 
  (0.0067)  (0.0068)  (0.0068)  (0.0067)  
 AIC 36,545   36,549   36,546   36,558   
 *** p<0.001,  ** p<0.010,  * p<0.050,  . p<0.100 
 Standard errors in parenthesis. All models also contain an intercept term and dummies for region and year of 
origination. These coefficients are not shown.  
 Data: Short PFF 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Our findings that large loan original amounts and high monthly payments are good predictors that 
a defaulted borrower will progress to a lis pendens filing, strongly supports the conclusion that 
reducing the principal balances on home mortgages would substantially reduce the foreclosure 
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rate. 
Reducing principal balances may be impractical, however. In cases where borrowers have 
negative equity, this option would require lenders to absorb potentially very large losses on their 
portfolio of mortgages. Secondly, an across-the-board reduction in principal balance would also 
benefit a large number of borrowers who otherwise would not default on their mortgages. 
On the other hand, if the modifications were well-structured, so that the balance-sheet effect 
of the lower probability of progressing to foreclosure offsets the losses that the lender would 
suffer by taking the loan to foreclosure, then reducing principal balances could potentially have 
the desired effect of reducing losses in the mortgage industry. Preliminary theoretical analysis 
suggests that as the lender’s percentage loss increases, the lender has more of an incentive to 
reduce principal balances. Given Carroll and Li’s (2011) finding of a 28 percent average loss rate 
when a borrower declares bankruptcy, reducing principal balances may be in the interest of both 
lenders and borrowers. In future research, we will attempt to quantify the savings that the 
industry would achieve from such modifications. 
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APPENDIX:  ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table 14: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Region 
 New York State Region Total Percent 
Capital 11,700 6.3% 
Central 7,259 3.9% 
Finger Lakes 12,641 6.8% 
Long Island 46,658 25.0% 
Mid-Hudson 28,487 15.3% 
Mohawk Valley 5,106 2.7% 
New York City 52,809 28.3% 
North County 2,952 1.6% 
Southern Region 5,376 2.9% 
Western Region 13,378 7.2% 
Total 186,366 100.0% 
Data: Full PFF 
 
 
Table 15: Lis Pendens Filings by Escrow Inclusion     
Escrow Status No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
payment inc. escrow 86.6% 13.4% 10,522 
payment does not inc. escrow 82.9% 17.1% 33,495 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Lis Pendens Filings by Investor-Owned Status 
 Ownership Status No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
Loan not investor owned 82.9% 17.1% 14,421 
Loan investor owned 84.2% 15.8% 29,596 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
 
 
Table 17: Lis Pendens Filings by Servicer Size     
Number of loans serviced No lis pendens Lis pendens Total 
under 100 92.9% 7.1% 42 
100 to 499 81.6% 18.4% 1,171 
500 to 999 90.5% 9.5% 823 
1,000 to 2,499 83.2% 16.8% 4,910 
2,500 to 4,999 79.3% 20.7% 3,980 
5,000 to 9,999 86.0% 14.0% 6,815 
10,000 to 19,999 88.5% 11.5% 8,096 
20,000 and up 81.7% 18.3% 18,180 
Percent 83.8% 16.2% 44,017 
Data: Short PFF 
 
 
